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ABSTRACT 
Market Power and Efficiency 
Levent Kutlu 
In the first chapter, we examine the relation between efficiency and competition 
in a dynamic framework. For this purpose, we measure efficiencies and conduct 
of the U.S. airlines in two city-pairs. We model the conduct parameter as an 
unobservable state variable which is an AR(1) process and estimate it by the 
square-root Kalman filter technique. Our results accords with Hick's (1935) 'quiet 
life hypothesis.' 
In the second chapter, we propose using the Kalman filter estimator (KFE) 
to estimate the technical efficiency. We assume that the effects term is an AR(1) 
process or a random walk. We apply the KFE to estimate the average efficiencies 
of the U.S. airlines during the period 1971-1986. We found evidence of 'quiet life 
hypothesis.' 
In the third chapter, we estimate the time-varying efficiencies of the U.S. banks 
during 1984-1995 with four different efficiency estimators. Using these series of 
ii 
efficiency estimates, we make a multivariate Kalman filter analysis to examine 
the efficiency trend in the U.S. banks during this period. We observed that the 
regulations and innovations had a positive effect on the efficiency of U.S. banks as 
expected. However, this positive effect decayed through time. 
The fourth chapter generalizes the well-known Battese-Coelli (1992) (BC) es-
timator to allow endogenous regressors. The regressors are still assumed to be 
independent of the effects though they are correlated with the irregular term. The 
simulations show the superiority of our method to the BC estimator. 
Efficiency is a residual that is caused by managerial mistakes. In the final 
chapter, we propose some strategies to minimize such mistakes in the Stackelberg 
competition world with price discrimination. We suggest that the leader should 
use its preemptive advantage to attract the highest value customers and that the 
follower should price discriminate over the residual demand. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Market Power and Efficiency: A Dynamic Approach 
1.1. Introduction 
"The quiet life hypothesis" (QLH) by Hicks (1935) argues that, due to manage-
ment's subjective cost of reaching the optimal profits, firms use their market power 
to allow inefficient allocation of resources. Increasing competitive pressure is likely 
to force management to work harder to reach optimal profits. Another hypothe-
sis that relates market power and efficiency is "the efficient structure hypothesis" 
(ESH) by Demsetz (1973). ESH argues that firms with superior efficiencies or tech-
nologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. These firms are assumed to 
gain larger market shares which lead to higher concentration. Any market power 
model that does not take this relationship into account risks becoming irrelevant. 
Unfortunately, the literature on market power measurement largely ignores this re-
lationship. Berg and Kim (1998), Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007), Delis 
and Tsionas (2009), and Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) exemplify some papers that 
consider the efficiencies of firms when measuring the market power. However, all 
these studies are made in a static setting. Hence, they ignore strategic and fun-
damental reasons that affect the firms' strategies. In contrast to these studies, we 
measure the market power in a dynamic setting. To the best of our knowledge, 
1 
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we are the first to consider the efficiencies of the firms when measuring the market 
power in a dynamic setting. 
In our empirical model, we estimate the market power of U.S. airlines in two 
city-pairs by both allowing and not allowing the inefficiencies of the firms. Us-
ing industry level cost data, we estimate the cost function parameters and time-
varying efficiencies by the within estimator proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt, and 
Sickles (1990) (CSSW). In order to estimate the conduct parameters, we extended 
a Kalman filter procedure dealing with the endogeneity problem that is proposed 
by Kim and Kim (2007) to the multivariate case. 
1.2. Measuring Market Power 
Market power is defined as the ability of a firm (or a group of firms) to raise the 
price of a good or a service above the competitive level. A widely used measure of 
market power is the Lerner index, proposed by Lerner (1934): 
(1-1) LS^£ 
This index measures how much market power a firm exercises as opposed to 
measuring how much market power it has. In some empirical works the Lerner 
index is used as a measure of profitability though Fisher (1987) criticizes this use. 
Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980) derive a link between the Lerner index and the 
3 
Herfindahl index which is a measure of market concentration. The Lerner index is 
independent of units of price and marginal cost (MC). Usually it is presumed to 
be between zero and one. 
The Lerner index assumes static profit maximization so that the firm produces 
MC equal to marginal revenue (MR). In dynamic markets, price and production are 
determined intertemporally. There are at least two reasons leading to a dynamic 
market setting: strategic and fundamental.1 If the firm believes that its rivals will 
respond to its current actions in the future, we say that the reason for the dynamic 
market setting is strategic. If the current action affects stock variables that affect 
future profits, then the reason for the dynamic market setting is fundamental. A 
stock variable might be amount of goodwill or knowledge, or level of a quasi-fixed 
output. In a dynamic setting, a risk-neutral firm maximizes discounted expected 
profits. Indeed, even for the static setting with price greater than MC, one can 
construct examples so that the Lerner index might not be reliable. Consider a 
monopolist who produces an exhaustible resource facing an isoelastic demand curve 
and has zero extraction cost. Although the Lerner index is one, the producer has 
no market power. In such cases Pindyck (1985) proposes using full marginal cost, 
which is MC plus user cost, rather than MC to measure the market power. 
Another approach for measuring market power is estimating a conduct para-
meter rather than the Lerner index. This approach uses a conjectural variations 
^ e e Perloff, Karp, and Golan (2007) for a book-length treatment of this subject. 
4 
approach and treats the conduct as a parameter to be estimated. One infers the 
conduct through the responsiveness of price to changes in demand elasticities. For 
a static setting the conduct is deduced from a generalization of the monopolist's 
first order condition: 
(1.2) P + 6QP'(Q) = MC 
where P is the price, Q is the industry output, and 6 is the industry conduct 
parameter. 
The conduct parameter is equal to one for perfect collusion (or monopoly); is 
equal to zero for perfect competition; and is equal to the inverse of the number of 
firms for a symmetric Cournot competition. Indeed, the conduct parameter that 
is derived from the above equation is nothing but a demand elasticity adjusted 
Lerner index. In the case of a high margin, markets with inelastic demand and less 
competitive markets are distinguished by this demand elasticity adjustment. One 
of the problems with this approach, like the Lerner index approach, is that it is 
static and hence not valid for dynamic oligopoly games.2 Corts (1999) argues that 
if the optimization problem of the firms is a dynamic one, then the success of the 
conduct parameter approach depends on the discount factor and the persistency 
of the demand. As the discount factor increases and the demand becomes more 
2See, Genesove and Mullin (1998) for some evaluations regarding the success of static oligopoly 
models in characterizing conduct. 
5 
persistent, then the conduct parameter approach becomes more accurate. The 
conduct parameter approach cannot detect any market power if the discount factor 
is low and the demand is i.i.d. Hence, a dynamic version of conduct parameters 
method is needed for a correct inference about market power. 
Considering changing market conditions, assuming a constant conduct might 
be too demanding. This assumption was relaxed by time-varying conduct models. 
Some examples to this approach are Bresnahan (1989), Brander and Zhang (1993), 
Gallet and Schroeter (1995), and Kim (2005). 
1.3. Measuring Efficiency 
Productive efficiency is a measure of performance of firms and is an important 
factor to consider when analyzing the effects of deregulation, mergers, and market 
structure. Technical efficiency can be used to rank firms according to their perfor-
mances and improve the managerial performances by indentifying "best practices" 
and "worst practices." A substantial research interest has focused on the topic of 
measuring a firm's level of efficiency. Stochastic frontier analysis originated with 
two innovational papers: Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), and Aigner, Lovell, 
and Schmidt (1977). Jondrow et al. (1982) provided a way to estimate firm spe-
cific technical efficiency. All these works were in cross section framework. Panel 
data gives more reliable information about the efficiencies of the firms. Schmidt 
and Sickles (1984) applied fixed effects and random effects models to estimate firm 
6 
specific efficiencies. This approach solves the inconsistency problem that one en-
counters in cross sectional context. The random effects model is still inconsistent 
if the effects are correlated with the regressors. Hausman and Taylor (1981) solve 
this problem by an instrumental variables approach. In all of these studies the effi-
ciencies are assumed to be time invariant. This assumption might not hold for long 
panel data and was relaxed by Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar 
(1990), and Battese and Coelli (1992).3 
1.4. The Square Root Kalman Filter 
The Kalman (1960) filter is a very useful technique for estimating time-varying 
parameter models.4 Unfortunately, for many econometric applications it provides 
invalid estimates due to the problem of endogeneity. In order to solve this problem 
some researchers5 use the fitted values of the endogenous regressors rather than 
the variables themselves in the Kalman filter estimation. This procedure resem-
bles two-stage least squares (2SLS) but, as Kim and Kim (2007) mention, it has no 
theoretical justification. Kim (2006) proposes a Heckman-type two-step MLE pro-
cedure6 that deals with the endogeneity problem for single equation time-varying 
parameter models.7 The first stage is similar to the first stage of 2SLS. The only 
3See, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for an extensive survey on stochastic frontier analysis. Also, 
see Sickles (2005) for comparisons of many efficiency estimators including recent ones. 
4See Harvey (1989) and Durbin and Koopman (2001) for detailed treatments of the Kalman 
filter in econometric applications. See also Koopman et al. (2007) for a basic introduction to the 
Kalman filter. 
5e.g. McKiearnan (1996), Bachetta and Gerlach (1997), and Peersman and Pozzi (2004). 
6See Heckman (1976). 
7See Kim and Nelson (2006) for an application of Kim (2006). 
7 
difference is that instead of using OLS to predict the expected value of the endoge-
nous right-hand-side variables he constructs instruments for the right-hand-side 
endogenous variables from the traditional Kalman filter in which the coefficients 
are time-varying. He assumes that the prediction error for the first stage is corre-
lated with the error term from measurement equation. This correlation is assumed 
to be time invariant. Using the error terms from the first stage, he constructs a new 
measurement equation that corrects the endogeneity bias. Kim and Kim (2007) 
criticize this approach as it does not specify a direct correlation between the first 
stage error term and the error term from the measurement equation. Moreover, 
Kim's approach fails to correct Pagan's (1984) generated regressors' problem in the 
second step. Kim and Kim (2007) provide a joint estimation method as well as a 
two-stage method for dealing with endogeneity. In order to estimate our empirical 
model, we extended the joint estimation method of Kim and Kim (2007) to the 
multivariate case. Moreover, the traditional Kalman filter estimation is known to 
be numerically unstable due to rounding errors which might cause variances to be 
non-positive definite during the update process. This implies that the traditional 
Kalman filter estimates might be heavily influenced by these rounding errors. One 
solution to this issue is using the square root Kalman filter. Hence, we further 
implement the square root Kalman filter. 
8 
1.5. Joint Estimation Procedure 
In this section we describe a way to extend the procedure of Kim and Kim 
(2007) to the multivariate square root Kalman filter framework. In this procedure, 
in addition to the dependent variable yt, we model the endogenous variables, xt, 
via the Kalman filter. It is assumed that the error term from the measurement 
equation of the dependent variable, et, and the error term from the measurement 
equation of the endogenous variables, et, are jointly normally distributed. This 
assumption allows us to decompose et into two components: One is correlated with 
the endogenous regressors and the other is not. After this decomposition one can 
calculate the relevant log-likelihood function via two separete Kalman filter runs. 
Now, we describe the model in more detail. Consider the following model with 
endogenous explanatory variables:8 
(1.3) yt = Xtau + et, e t~N(0,.ffi). 
(1.4) aM+i = TiaM + Riuht, Ui.t ~ N(0,Qi) 
(1.5) ai,i ~ N(ai , i ,P u ) 
(1.6) xt = Zta2,t + et, et~N(0,H2) 
8See Jin and Jorgenson (2009) for a special case where the parameters in the instrument equation 
(i.e. equation (1.6)) do not vary. 
9 
(1.7) a2,t+i = T20i2!t + R2u2,t, u2,t ~ N(0, Q2) 
(1.8) a2,i ~ N(a2ii,P2,i) 
where yt is a p x 1 vector of observations, xt is a m x 1 vector of regressors; 
Zt = Im® z[ where zt is a Z x 1 (with / > m) vector of exogenous variables; and 
Xt = Ip® x't, Ti is a transition matrix, Ri is a selection matrix and determines 
whether a state will be stochastic or not. We assume that et, et, uitt, and «2,t are 
serially independent and independent at all other time periods. Moreover, error 
terms are independent with a^i and a2]i. For the sake of avoiding unnecessary 
details we assume that all regressors are endogenous. 
Let et = H2 et and assume that the correlations between et and etj are 
constant over time for j = 1,2, ...,p and denoted by Py The correlation between 
eti and etj is denoted by piy Thus, the joint distribution of et, eti,£t2, •••, £tP is given 
by: 
-\ 1 
(1-9) et et2 ea ••• etp ~N(0,J2) 
where 
10 
fi = 
fin = J, 
fill fii2 
fi21 fi22 
fil2 
fi21 
Pl<*ei P2cr£2 ••• PVaev 
= n' 12 
fi22 — -"1 — 
Pl2cre1CTe2 
pl2aeia£2 cr£2 
P\Pae10Ev P2pC r£2C r£P 
• P\vaei°£v 
• P2pae2^ep 
Hence we have: 
(1.10) Proj £ti £t2 £tp et = fi2ifin et = fi2iet 
(1.11) MSE = fi22-fi2ifiri1fi 22 — "21"n "12 
— fio9 — fi9lfi 22 — J42li£l2 
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This implies that: 
(1.12) £*i £«2 • ' " £tp Tet + wt 
where wt ~ iV(0, MS£) and T = fi2i-
Hence, we can write the measurement equation as: 
(1.13) yt = Xtat + re t + wt 
= Xtat + TH-1/2(xt - Zta2,t) + wt 
Now, consider the following joint density function: 
(1.14) f(Y,X) = UttyuXtlYt-uXt-J 
t 
= J[f(yt,\xt,Yt_1,Xt-1)f(xt\Xt-1) 
where Fi = {2/1,3/2, ---,2/*} and Xt = {x1,x2, ...,xt}. 
We have: 
12 
(1.15) yt = E[yt\xt,Yt_1]=Xtau + rH;1/\xt-Zta2,t) 
(1.16) FU = var[j/t|xt>rt_1]=xtplitxt' + r^2-1/2z tp2, tz^2-1/2r , + r 
(1.17) xt = E[xt\Xt_1) = Ztau 
(1.18) F2,t = Var[xt\Xi-x]=ZtP2,tZ't + H2 
where ai,t = . E ^ t l x t , ^ ! , ! ^ ! ] , ^ = Far[au |z t ,X t_i,r t_i],a2,t = £[a2 , t |^t-i], 
Kar[a2,t|Xt_i], and T = MSE. 
The joint density function at time t in equation (4.3) becomes: 
(1.19) ffaxtPt-uXt-!) = (27r)-^+m)/2 |F t |-1/2exp ( - l ^ v ? ) 
Fht 0 
0 F2)t 
In order to calculate equation (1.19) one can run the traditional square root 
Kalman filter to the following state space model: 
where vt = 
Vt-yt 
xt -xt 
and Ft = 
13 
(1.20) 
(1.21) 
(1.22) 
(1.23) 
Vt 
xt 
= 
TH~l,2xt 
0 
+ 
xt 
0 
-TH~1/2Zt 
zt 
<*i,t 
«2,« 
+ 
Wt 
et 
wt 
et 
~ N 
/ 
V 
0 
0 
1 
T 0 
0 H2 
«2,t+l 
= 
Ti 0 
0 T2 «2,« 
+ 
i?i 0 
0 R2 
Ui,t 
U2,t 
Ui,t 
u2,t 
~ N 
/ 
I 
0 
0 
J 
Qi o 
0 Q2 
In a more compact way: 
(1.24) 
(1.25) 
yt = At + Btat + et,et~N{0,H) 
at+i = T&t + Rur, i t r ~ N ( 0 , Q) 
The corresponding Kalman filter equations are given as: 
14 
(1.26) 
(1.27) 
(1.28) 
(1.29) 
(1.30) 
vt = yt-At- Btat 
lT?-l Kt = rPtB'tFt 
at+1 = rat + Ktvt 
Lt = T-KtBt 
Pt+1 = TPtL't + RQR' 
From these we can compute the corresponding square root Kalman filter equa-
tions. Let: 
(1.31) Ut = 
BtPt T 0 
rPt 0 RQ 
where Pt = PtPi T = TV, Q = QQ' in which matrices PUTU and Q are lower 
triangular matrices. If p = 2, then T is given by: 
(1.32) 
(1.33) 
Tn = V1 ~ PiPi^ei 
rf Pl2 ~ PlP2 _ 
J 21 = -O, 
V1 ~ PlPl 
£2 
(1.34) 
V 1 - P1P1 
62 
Note that: 
(1.35) UtUi = 
Ft BtPtr' 
TPtB't rPtT' + RQR' 
One can transform Ut by Givens transformations so that Ut 
(1.36) Ut 
Uu 0 0 
U2,t Us,t 0 
is a lower triangular rectangular matrix. We deduce that: 
(1.37) 
(1.38) 
(1.39) 
Ultt = Ft 
U2,t = KtFt 
U$tt = Pt+i 
where Ft = FtF[ and Ft is lower triangular. 
16 
Thus by updating Ut we obtain the square root updated version of Pt+i- Update 
for at+i is also straightforward and given as: 
(1-40) at+1 = rat + U2,tU^vt 
For sake of completeness we also provide the smoothing and the corresponding 
square root equations. The smoothing equations are not affected apart from the 
way in which relevant variables are computed in the Kalman filter step and are 
given as: 
(1-41) rt_x = B'tFt-lvt + Ltrt 
(1.42) at = (k + Ptrt-! 
(1.43) Wt_! = B'tF^Xt + LtNtL't 
(1.44) Vt = Pt-PtNt^Pt 
where rn = 0, Nn = 0, and at and Vt are the smoothed state and variance, 
respectively. 
For the square root version of these equations we only need to concentrate on 
Nt. Hence, we just explain the way in which Nt-\ is updated. Let: 
17 
(1.45) Nt t-\ B'tUr* L'tNt 
where Nt = NtN^ and Nt is lower triangular. 
It follows that by transforming the matrix iVt*_i to a lower triangular matrix 
via Givens transformations we obtain Nt-i-
1.6. The Empirical Model and Estimations 
We examine the market power of U.S. airlines in Chicago-San Diego (SAN) and 
Chicago-Salt Lake City (SLC) city-pairs. We allow for inefficiency in our analysis 
and MCs of firms are estimated taking this into account. First we give the dynamic 
competition model, then state details of estimations. 
1.6.1. The Dynamic Competition Model 
The model we describe in this section is reminiscent of Puller's (2008) model. While 
he only models the market power for symmetric firms, we allow for asymmetry. 
Moreover, in contrast to Puller (2008) we estimate industry conduct rather than 
firm level conduct. Firms choose output and play an efficient supergame where 
no structural assumptions are made about the form of the punishment rules for 
deviations from the coalition strategies. However, these deviations will be pun-
ished and this will lead to lower profits, such as those consistent with a Cournot 
equilibrium. As in Puller (2008), we assume a full-information environment similar 
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to that of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). At the beginning of each period firms 
know the demand and cost shocks before they make their decisions. Then the 
firms simultaneously make their strategic decisions which become common knowl-
edge. The observability of the shocks allows the oligopoly members to adjust their 
quantity choices to settle the profits down whenever the incentive to cheat is at 
high levels. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) show that whenever the demand and 
the cost are linear the incentive to deviate from collusion is higher as the demand 
increases. They also give a counter example showing that this might not be the 
case otherwise. 
First, we specify the linear inverse demand function as: 
(1.46) pit = (30 + PxQt + p2PCIt + £ kkQtrkt + eit 
fc=i 
where p is the price, PCI is the per capita income, and Qtr are the seasonal 
dummies. 
Firm i's profit function is given by: 
(1.47) Kit - Pit(Qt)Qit ~ C(qit; eit) 
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where e* is the inefficiency level and C is the cost function. We assume that firms 
share the same cost frontier but they have different efficiency levels. Hence, the 
realized cost is affected by the efficiency of the firms. This introduces asymmetry 
to our model. Cost depends on the city-pair market but, for the sake of notational 
simplicity, we suppressed all city-pair subscripts. The cost function is given by: 
(1.48) In C(qit; eit) = In C(qit) + vit + uit 
where uu > 0 and vu ~ iV(0, a^) are mutually independent random variables and 
eit = 1 — exp(—uu) is the inefficiency of firm % at time t. 
From the above equation the MCs are calculated as follows: 
(1.49) M C t e . ; e i , ) = f f a " ) a f t e ' ) 
1 - eu dqu 
Hence, for a fully efficient firm we have: 
(1.50) MC(qit) = C(qit)dlnC{qit) dqu 
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Henceforth, unless stated elsewhere the inefficiency term is dropped from the 
MC function as the following analysis does not depend on whether the firms are 
inefficient or not apart from the way that MCs are calculated. Hence, all the 
following formulas are for both the inefficiency and the full efficiency cases. The 
optimization problem of the firms is given by: 
(1.51) Q*t(St,f3) = a rgmaxVV^Si iQt , ;^ ) st 
Qt,st ^—J 
oo oo 
<{Qf, St) + £ PkEt[7rrit(St+k)] < 7:it(sitQt; St) + £ PkEt[n*t(St+k)} Vi 
k=X fc=l 
where s is the market share, Qt is the total quantity, irb is the best response profit 
at time t, irr is the profit for the retaliation period, n* is the profit when collusion 
is sustained, St = wt xt is the state of the world at time t, and (3 is the 
discount factor. The components of the state are as follows: wt is the cost shock 
and xt is the demand shock. 
The first-order condition for the output is: 
(1.52) ^ T ^ T O ^ + P(Q*t) - MC^SuQ^Su - fi = 0 
i 
(1.53) P'iQDQl + YsMK^suQDsu-n; = 0 
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(1.54) 9tP'(Q*t)Q*t+MKt-ri = 0 
(1.55) OtWt+MKt-fi = 0 
where MKit = P — MCit is the markup for firm i, MKt = £^ MKitsu is the 
market share weighted markup, and //£ is the dynamic factor which reflects the 
incentive compatibility constraint. 
Appelbaum (1982) defines the industry Lemer index as the market share-
weighted Lemer index. He defines the degree of the market power of an industry 
as the industry Lerner index. Similar to his index, our model involves the market 
share-weighted markup as the industry markup. We call this markup the industry 
markup. A traditional model for the industry conduct is: 
(1.56) MK = -BQP\Q). 
Our model resembles the traditional model. The only difference is the /^ term 
that is introduced due to the dynamic nature of the problem. If /^ = 0 for each 
t, we can conclude that firms are playing a static game. If /z£ ^ 0, then firms 
are playing a repeated game and not including //£ causes an omitted variable bias. 
We define 0t as the industry conduct. If 6t = 0 and ^ = 0, then we can deduce 
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that the industry conduct is consistent with perfect competition and if dt = 1, it 
is consistent with efficient collusion. After estimating our model one can calculate 
the dynamic version of the Lerner index as follows: 
( L 5 7 ) L
 = P ~edQP ~ ~ ? 
We examine the consequences of not considering the efficiencies of firms on 
market power analysis for the dynamic game environment. For obvious reasons, 
most of the dynamic models do not assume asymmetry. Unfortunately, if the firms 
are inefficient, then this might lead to substantially inaccurate conclusions about 
the market power. If //£ is a function of the efficiency levels, we can conclude 
that the classical repeated game models give invalid inferences by not taking into 
account the effect of the efficiency on the market power. Even if //£ is not a function 
of efficiency levels, the optimization model may be irrelevant if the firm-specific 
cost structures that account for inefficiencies are not utilized. As the "degree" of 
inefficiency increases, the severity of the bias from this kind of misspecification 
would also increase. Finally, we estimate a counterfactual model for inefficiency. 
From the stochastic frontier model of CSS, we find the efficient cost frontier and 
assume that all firms share the corresponding efficient MC function. Then we 
estimate the market power of the firms assuming full efficiency. This provides us 
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a vehicle for examining how much market power firms lose by not exploiting their 
full-efficiencies. 
1.6.2. The Data 
The data we use for the cost estimations is a quarterly panel data 1980I-1993IV. 
These data are constructed from the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Form 
41/T100 and are discussed in more detail in Wingrove, et al (1997), Alam and 
Sickles (2000), and Ahn, Good, and Sickles (2000). There are four main inputs: 
labor, energy, flight capital, and a residual category called materials. Materials 
include supplies, outside services, and non-flight capital. Quantity and price data 
are calculated by the multilateral Tornqvist-Theil index number procedure. Flight 
capital is disaggregated into short haul capital and long haul capital. We include 
two aircraft attributes to describe flight capital: average size (measured in seats) 
and fuel efficiency. The data set for the cost includes information for 11 airlines: 
American Airlines (AA), Continental Airlines (CO), Delta Airlines (DL), Frontier 
Airlines (FL), Northwest Airlines (NW), Ozark Air Lines (OZ), Piedmont Airlines 
(PI), Republic Airlines (RC), Trans World Airlines (TW), US Air (US), and United 
Airlines (UA). 
The labor input was composed of 93 separate labor accounts aggregated into 
five employment classes: flight deck crews, flight attendants, mechanics, passen-
ger/cargo/aircraft handlers, and other personnel. Since we do not have the number 
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of hours worked by each working class, we could not correct for different utiliza-
tion rates. In 1977, Schedule P10 was changed from quarterly data to annual data. 
Hence, after 1977 we only know fourth quarter values of employee numbers for 
specific categories. Missing periods were calculated by interpolation. After the 
1987 modification in Form 41, many expense accounts were eliminated. In order 
to preserve the compatibility relevant modifications made to data: For example, 
trainees and instructors moved to other personal category. The monthly personal 
data converted to quarterly data by averaging the number of full-time employees 
plus one-half of the part-time employees over the corresponding quarter. After 
obtaining the relevant head count information for each employment category, the 
multilateral Tornqvist-Theil index number procedure is used to derive the aggre-
gate labor input. 
The energy input is meant to capture aircraft fuel only. Fuel that is used 
for ground operations and electricity are included in materials index. The energy 
input was developed by combining the information on aircraft fuel gallons used 
with fuel expense data per period. For normalization multilateral Tornqvist-Theil 
index number procedure is used to derive the final energy input. 
The materials input consist of 69 expenditure accounts aggregated into 12 
classes. Since the carrier specific price or quantity deflators were not available, 
industry-wide price deflators are used. In 1987, Schedules P6 and P7 changed. This 
led to elimination of many account categories. The data is adjusted to preserve 
the consistency. 
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DOT Form 41, Schedule T2 contains relevant information about the number of 
aircrafts for each different model of aircraft. Data for technological characteristics 
for aircrafts that are in significant use were collected from Jane's All the World's 
Aircraft (1945 through 1982 editions), henceforth JATWA. The average number 
of aircrafts in service is constructed by dividing the total number of aircraft days 
for all aircraft types by the number of the days in the quarter. 
In order to adjust this measure of capital, average equipment size is used. For 
each aircraft type, highest density single-class seating configuration that is listed 
in JATWA was used. The fleet-wide average of the number of the seats per aircraft 
is calculated by taking a weighted average of each aircraft type where the weights 
are the number of aircrafts of each type. In some cases the actual number of seats 
was substantially less than described by this configuration. This is because airlines 
sometimes reconfigure aircrafts for their need of first-class and business-class seats. 
We use the average number of months since the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's type certification of aircraft designs as our measure of fleet vintage. It is 
assumed that technology for an aircraft does not change unless its design is recer-
tified for its type. This only captures significant innovations. Hence, our model 
does not fully capture the deterioration in capital and increased maintenance costs 
caused by use. 
The output data consist of two components: scheduled output and non-scheduled 
output. Non-scheduled output includes cargo and charter operations. We used rev-
enue and output data from DOT form 41. From these data seven different outputs 
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produced by a typical airline are identified. The price of the output is constructed 
by dividing the revenue generated by the corresponding category by its output 
quantity. Some carriers offered only one type of service. In such cases, the service 
was redefined to be coach class. Charter operations for cargo and passenger service 
outputs were combined into a single category. Since their output units are differ-
ent, the average passenger is assumed to weight 200 pounds including the baggage. 
Also, changes in DOT form 41 in 1985 led to the elimination of the distinction 
between express cargo and air freight. Hence, two categories were combined. All 
aggregations were done via multilateral Tornqvist-Theil index number procedure. 
The prices were normalized to 1.0 in the baseline period. 
Two characteristics of airline output are calculated. These include load factor 
and stage length. Load factor provides a measure of service quality and is a widely 
used proxy for service competition in most airline transportation studies. This is 
found by dividing revenue passenger miles by available seat miles. Stage length 
provides a measure of the length of individual route segments in the carrier's net-
work. Generally, the shorter the flight, the higher the proportion of ground services 
required per passenger mile. This implies that, in general, shorter flights have a 
higher cost per mile than longer flights. The average stage length is calculated by 
dividing the total revenue aircraft miles flown by total revenue aircraft departures. 
The costs of airlines differ largely because of economies of density. The cost 
reduction is attributable to increasing output on an unchanged network. For ex-
ample, this can be achieved by flying the same number of frequencies with larger 
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aircraft. This is why airlines increasingly try to exploit economies of density by 
building hub-and-spoke route networks. With the help of this network system, 
larger aircrafts are utilized more than otherwise could have been justified. We use 
the average size of the fleet to capture the effect of economies of density on cost. 
The data we use for the conduct estimations is a quarterly panel data 19801-
1988IV. These data are constructed from the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
DB1A data set, which includes a one in ten sample of all tickets issued from January 
1980 through December 1988, discussed in more detail in Weiher (2002) and Good, 
Sickles, and Weiher (2008). Our data is obtained by aggregating this monthly data 
to quarterly data. Although the original data set reported tickets up to twenty 
three segments, in our data set we allow only for six segments. This eliminates 
only a little more than 1% of the data. The data we use for the conduct estimation 
includes information for 6 airlines: AA, CO, DL, NW, TW, and UA. 
1.6.3. Estimating the Marginal Cost 
As mentioned earlier, we allow inefficiency in our cost function estimation. We also 
estimate the cost function under the assumption of symmetric firms. Rather than 
estimating MC, we calculate it from our cost function estimates. Unfortunately, 
we only have data for the entire US system and not for specific city-pair routes. 
We solve this problem by incorporating a specific number of enplanements for 
each airline, a specific distance of relevant city-pairs as well as airline fixed effects. 
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The distance between two city-pairs is calculated as an average itinerary distance 
between these city-pairs. We assume the following cost structure:9 
+/33 In - ^ + f3A In £npi4 + 05 In Progft 
+/36 In Nroqit + 07 In SLit + /38 In LFit 
3 
+(39 In Avesit + J^ SkQtrkt + Dummies 
where fiit = b^ + bn^ + bi2(^)2 is the time-varying effects term that is used to 
calculate the efficiencies of the firms (for the symmetric case /3it = &o+&i|;+&2(|02)) 
LP is the labor price, KP is the capital price, EP is the energy price, MP is the 
materials price, Enp is the number of enplanements, Proq is the passenger revenue 
output quantity, Nroq is the non-scheduled revenue output quantity, SL is the 
stage length, LF is load factor, Aves is the average size of the airline fleet, Fuel is 
fuel efficiency, Qtr are seasonality dummies, Dummies are firm and period specific 
dummies (Iran-Iraq war; gulf war; air traffic strike; AA and CL merger; CO and 
EA buyout; CO and FR merger; CO and TI merger; RC and HA merger; NW and 
9We also tried full and restricted translog functional forms. In all of our attempts the concavity 
condition failed at almost all sample points. This result was robust to which estimator that we 
used. Battese-Coelli estimator, Battese-Coelli estimator combined with input share equations, 
and a first order Taylor series approximation to the Kumbhakar's (1997) exact model for allocative 
inefficiency, which introduces the allocative inefficiency in a consistent way, are a few examples 
for such estimators. 
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RC merger; TW and OZ merger; US and PSA merger; DL and WN merger; UA 
pilot strike; and CO pilot strike). 
We want to estimate not only the MCs of the firms but also their time-varying 
efficiencies. As mentioned earlier, we used the CSSW estimator for this purpose. 
This estimator approximates the time-varying effects term by a second degree time 
polynomial. Although CSS use a two stage method, we estimated our model in one 
stage. We imposed homogeneity restriction in our estimations. Hence, estimated 
cost functions are homogenous of degree one in prices. The cost estimates are given 
in Table 1.1. 
After estimating the cost function, we calculated the estimate of MC as: 
(1.59) MC = MCenp + MCprog x Miles Flown 
In order to calculate the MC we used the coefficients from the third estimator. 
Our MC estimates correspond very well with those of Weiher, Sickles, and Perloff 
(2003). Figure 1.1 gives the market share weighted efficiencies. 
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In our data period the behavior of the airlines is affected by, at least, three im-
portant events: The Airline Deregulation Act (1978); the second oil crisis (1979); 
and 1980's oil glut (1980-1986).10 The deregulation increased the competitiveness 
which put a downward pressure on the market power of airlines. The oil crisis have 
two opposing effects on the market power: An increase in cost due to increase in 
input prices and a (possible) decrease in the dynamic cost due to binding incen-
tive compatibility constraints. The overall effect of the oil crisis depends on the 
functional forms of demand and supply as well as the punishment scheme of the 
dynamic game that the airlines are playing. If the former effect dominates, then 
the oil crisis would put a downward pressure on the market power of the airlines. 
Hence, both the deregulation and the oil crisis decrease the market power. This 
implies that the fall in the inefficiency levels between 1980-1984 is an evidence sup-
porting the 'quiet life hypothesis.' In this period the airlines gradually increased 
their efficiency levels. Then, the inefficiency level suddenly peaked in 1986. This 
is because of the oil price collapse in 1986. Since a positive cost shock (might) 
increase the incentive to deviate from a coalition, the sudden decrease in the in-
efficiency level following 1986 oil price collapse might be due to a breakdown in 
coalition. The efficiency estimates in this chapter are similar to the estimates in 
the next chapter. 
101980's oil glut is the period in which the price of the oil fell after the second oil crisis. Although 
the price of oil fell for about six years, it never reached its pre-oil crisis levels. 
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1.6.4. Estimating the Supply-Demand System 
We estimate the supply-demand system via the square root Kalman filter. First, 
we give the details about the demand and supply equations. For each city-pair 
market, the inverse demand for firm i is assumed to be as follows: 
(1.60) Pt = 0Q + PrQt + P2PCIt + £ hkQtrkt + £t 
fc=i 
where Pt is the market share weighted price, PCI is the population weighted per 
capita income for relevant city-pairs, Qtr are seasonality dummies, and Su is the 
error term. 
Firms' dynamic behavior is influenced by current demand levels, expected fu-
ture demands, current costs, and expected future costs.11 We use industry market 
output divided by expected industry market output for the next period as our 
demand shock variable. We proxy expected industry market output with future 
output. Input price indices are geometric means of the expenditure share-weighted 
input prices. The weights in this index are expenditure shares of each cost com-
ponent. The supply shock is given by the ratio of this index to its expectation for 
the next period. Again we use the next period value of this index as a proxy to its 
future expectation. We use demeaned shock variables in our estimations. Hence, 
we model [i\ as a linear function of the shocks and the inefficiency: 
11See, Borenstein and Shepard (1996). 
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(1.61) n*t = n0 + n,xwt + n2xt + n3et 
Moreover, we assume that the conduct is an unobserved time-varying state 
whose evolution is generated by AR(1) shocks. The demand-supply system be-
comes: 
(1.62) Pt = Po + ^Qt + ^PCIt+EkkQtrkt + eu 
fc=i 
(1.63) MKt = -att^Qt ~ OtPiQt + V0 + A*i^ t + \Hxt + thet + £2t 
(1.64) at+i = pait + rit 
where 9t = E[9t\V], at = 6t - 6t, ^ | ~ N(0,H), Vt ~ N(0,Q), and <*i ~ 
The instrumental variables for our model are the industry output and the 
industry average price as well as the exogenous variables PCI, Qtr, w, x, and 
e. Our estimates for the demand-supply system are given in Table 1.2. We used 
the likelihood ratio test in order to determine whether the firms are playing a 
static game or a dynamic game. For SAN at a 5 percent significance level, we 
conclude that the game is static. In contrast to SAN, for SLC the game turned 
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out to be dynamic. In our empirical example, following Rotemberg and Saloner 
(1986), a boom in demand increases the incentive to deviate. The bias in the 
market power estimates is larger whenever there is a demand boom or a positive 
cost shock. Note that for both SAN and SLC the cost shock and the demand 
shock have opposite signs as expected. For both city-pairs the inefficiency terms 
in the dynamic factors are significant at 10 percent level. Generally, as the average 
inefficiency level increases the "degree" of asymmetry among firms would increase 
as well. Hence, the collusion becomes harder to sustain and this decreases the 
market power. Moreover, since more efficient firms have higher markups, they 
have more to gain from deviation. In order to get an idea about how much market 
power is lost/gained when firms utilize their full efficiencies, we compare the market 
powers of the inefficient MC and efficient MC cases. For both city-pairs we did 
not observe a significant change in market power. 
Figure 1.2 gives the dynamic conducts, two standard error confidence intervals 
for the dynamic conducts, the symmetric cost conducts, and the static conducts.12 
The biases are upwards under the assumption of static game and downwards for 
the symmetric cost case. The upwards bias is due to ignored dynamic factors and 
the downwards bias is due to over-estimation of MCs. 
The OLS estimates for the inefficiency-conduct slopes are given in Table 1.3. 
These results support QLH.13 For the banking industry while Berger and Hannan 
12For the symmetric cost function case we provide the static game estimates for SAN and the 
dynamic game estimates for SLC. 
i.e. we observe that there is a negative relationship between efficiency and market power. 
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(1998) supports the QLH, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007) suggest that 
the relationship between market power and cost efficiency is positive. Another 
study by Delis and Tsionas (2009) shows that while on average the QLH is sup-
ported those banks with more efficient management has relatively more market 
power. 
Table 1.2. Dynamic Game Estimates 
SAN SLC 
Inefficient Efficient Symmetric Static Inefficient Efficient Symmetric Static 
Po 
Pi 
* 1 
p2 
~ 2 
S i 
^ 2 
5a 
H 
M-i 
1*2 
H 
8 
P 
P i 
~ i 
p. 
-179.7954 
(99.8867) 
-10.1364'" 
(1.5578) 
60.7070'" 
(10.2063) 
-17.8680' 
(8.5293) 
32.8212' 
(14.0222) 
46.8010" ' 
(13.6080) 
49.5252 
(45.5529) 
-41.7642" 
(13.1419) 
95.0603" 
(35.6776) 
-2.6598 
(1.4532) 
0.1167 
(0.1281) 
0.7899"' 
(0.2103) 
0.5483' 
(0.2673) 
-0.8595'" 
(0.0366) 
-91.1969"" 
(26.7361) 
-8.5972'" 
(0.9531) 
50.8623'" 
(3.1854) 
-18.1089' 
(7.6959) 
21.4005' 
(10.7864) 
35.0231" 
(11.2296) 
109.6428' 
(51.0647) 
-55.2878' 
(26.5138) 
63.6637 
(103.9800) 
0.0000 
(-) 
-0.0187 
(0.1668) 
0.8360'" 
(0.2501) 
0.1623 
(0.3158) 
-0.8374"' 
(0.0984) 
-136.0509"' 
(4.4794) 
-9.4504'" 
(0.6683) 
56.1100'" 
(1.6731) 
-17.5196' 
(8.3244) 
26.2222" 
(9.4196) 
38.5866"" 
(11.1186) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
-0.0837" 
(0.0332) 
0.8407'" 
(0.1451) 
0.3018 
(0.2201) 
-0.8435'" 
(0.0605) 
-90.1739"" 
(6.3614) 
-8 .8341 '" 
(0.7387) 
51.3590'" 
(1.7671) 
-17.5025' 
(7.9652) 
24.0242" 
(7.6494) 
35.9539"' 
(9.2927) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0975'" 
(0.0260) 
0.8466'" 
(0.1649) 
0.2226 
(0.2452) 
-0 .8611 '" 
(0.0521) 
-94.6148"" 
(17.5149) 
-6.9566'" 
(1.1435) 
51.1167'" 
(3.0968) 
15.4983 
(12.2538) 
-14.5617 
(17.1960) 
-0.0746 
(16.7587) 
202.2628"' 
(60.5038) 
-115.1264"' 
(32.5559) 
160.0243 
(90.4186) 
-2.1856 
(1.3397) 
-0.1501 
(0.1652) 
0.8219'" 
(0.1197) 
0.3943" 
(0.1876) 
-0.0226 
(0.3009) 
-110.8948"' 
(22.0313) 
-7.0955*" 
(0.9739) 
52.3596'" 
(3.5308) 
18.9987 
(15.7154) 
-5.0397' 
(14.6144) 
5.3498 
(13.9064) 
173.9227'" 
(31.7741) 
-122.8321* 
(48.9401) 
133.6866" 
(143.9166) 
0.0000 
(-) 
-0.0491 
(0.1272) 
0.6638' 
(0.2382) 
0.4158' 
(0.1888) 
-0.0448 
(0.3785) 
-125.9973'"' 
(26.4067) 
-7.1875"" 
(0.9887) 
54.2783"* 
(3.6462) 
13.4377 
(13.0270) 
-17.8894 
(14.3152) 
-5.3553 
(18.4702) 
166.6795" 
(72.7441) 
-88.2581 
(60.2404) 
163.4894 
(86.1330) 
0.0000 
(-) 
-0.4498 
(0.3154) 
0.9530"" 
(0.1139) 
0.4084" 
(0.1834) 
0.0161 
(0.3530) 
-141.1308" 
(50.0440) 
-4.7394'" 
(1.3928) 
47.3161 
(5.4448) 
33.9590 
(17.7662) 
6.6223 
(13.3151) 
-3.2223 
(12.7022) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.0000 
(-) 
0.5822'" 
(0.1143) 
0.8555" ' 
(0.1961) 
-0.1863 
(0.5205) 
-0.6463 
(0.5049) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
" p < 0 . 0 5 , " p < 0 . 0 1 , ' " p < 0 . 0 0 1 
Table 1.3. Conduct versus Inefficiency 
Inefficiency 
SAN 
Conduct 
Constant 
SLC 
Conduct 
Constant 
Coeff. 
36.3337" 
17.5995*** 
33.8719*** 
27.8025*** 
SE 
(10.7063) 
(1.7082) 
(8.5081) 
(1.1162) 
Robust errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Figure 1.2. City-Pair Conducts 
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1.7. Welfare Issues 
In this section we consider the welfare implications of our model. For this 
purpose we use the SAN estimates as an illustration. We assume that MC is 
constant and airlines are playing a static game. In Figure 3. we provide the 
estimated conduct as well as two equilibrium paths. Our equilibrium estimate 
is very close to the sample mean of (Q, P). In this figure: EMC is the efficient 
marginal cost; MC is the full marginal cost; P is the price; MR is the marginal 
revenue; PMR is the perceived marginal revenue for the estimated equilibrium; 
mean Q is the sample mean of (Q,P); Eqm path QLH and Eqm path ESH are 
two equilibrium paths that are consistent with QLH and ESH, respectively;14 and 
2 std CI PMR is the two standard error confidence interval for PMR. 
Figure 1.3. Equilibrium Analysis 
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For both cases the maximum inefficiency level that is reached is approximately 0.35. 
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F g j B 1.4. DWLCarparison 
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We have at least two types of problems if we do not consider the inefficiencies 
of the firms for a market power analysis. First, ignoring inefficiencies of the firms 
from the analysis might lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Second, even if 
the parameter estimates are consistent the DWL estimates would be inaccurate. 
In the inefficiency context, a shift from monopoly to competition not only lowers 
the price but also changes the MC.ls Hence, in contrast to the traditional DWL 
analysis, we have to calculate the EMC. By stochastic frontier techniques one can 
easily calculate the EMC. 
In this section, we consider the second problem. Assume that somehow the 
econometrician estimates the relevant parameters consistently but believes that 
the heterogeneity among airlines is due to firm specific differences rather than the 
15See Comanor and Leibenstein (1969) and Parish and Ng (1972) for more detailed arguments 
about DWL calculation under inefficiency. 
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difference in the efficiencies of these airlines.16 The econometrician would conclude 
that the DWL is equal to the area C. On the other hand if we consider the 
inefficiencies of the firms, then the DWL is given by the area A+B + C. In our case 
A + B + C >^ C. Unfortunately, the problem is more severe than just having a size 
difference for DWL estimates. While the traditional DWL is a monotone function 
of the conduct, for the inefficiency case this might not be true. If we believe that 
for some efficiency levels ESH holds, the equilibrium path will not be monotone. So 
the DWL would not be monotone as well. For our ESH equilibrium path unless the 
antitrust authorities could enforce very high levels of competition, it is preferable 
to have high market power levels. Finally, the misinterpreted measure do not 
find significant DWL for 9 G [0.1,0.2]. This is obviously not true if we take the 
inefficiencies of the airlines into account. Hence, unless we know the relationship 
between the conduct and the efficiency, it is very hard to evaluate the effects of 
market power. 
1.8. Conclusion 
In this study we have used a dynamic model of conduct in order to examine the 
relationship between market power and efficiency. We applied our model to two 
city-pairs in the U.S. airline industry. Although for one of the city-pairs (SAN) 
we did not find evidence for a dynamic game, for the other city-pair (SLC) we 
concluded that the game is a dynamic one. For SLC not considering the dynamic 
16Here we assume that the econometrician consistently estimates /zt as well. 
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factors led to a substantially inaccurate inferences. We observe that the static con-
duct is biased upwards and the symmetric conduct is biased downwards. Moreover, 
a negative relationship is identified between the market conduct and the average 
efficiency of the market. This result accords with the efficient structure hypothesis 
of Hicks (1935). Finally, we conclude that even if we can estimate the conduct 
consistently, it is not easy to make inferences about the DWL. In order to solve 
this problem one has to identify the relationship between the conduct and the 
efficiency. In this paper, while we did not address this issue, by using stochastic 
frontier techniques we provided a novel way to calculate the point DWL for the 
estimated equilibrium. 
CHAPTER 2 
Measuring Efficiency: A Kalman Filter Approach 
2.1. Introduction 
Stochastic frontier analysis originated with two innovational papers: Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977), and Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977). Jondrow 
et al. (1982) provided a way to estimate firm specific technical efficiency. But 
all these works are in cross section framework. Panel data gives more reliable in-
formation about the efficiencies of the firm. Sickles and Schmidt (1984) applied 
fixed effects and random effects models to estimate firm specific efficiencies. This 
approach solves the inconsistency problem that one encounters in cross sectional 
context. The random effects estimator gives inconsistent estimates if the effects 
are correlated with the regressors. Hausman and Taylor (1981) (HT) provide an 
instrumental variables solution to this problem. In all of these approaches, effi-
ciencies are assumed to be time invariant. For long panel data this assumption is 
questionable. Time invariance assumption was relaxed by Cornwell, Schmidt, and 
Sickles (1990) (CSS), Kumbhakar (1990), and Battese and Coelli (1992) (BC). All 
the estimators that we mentioned are parametric estimators. The problem with 
parametric estimators is that they might impose too much of parametric smooth-
ness. For semi-parametric efficient estimators of technical efficiency one can cite 
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Park, Sickles, and Simar (1998) (PSS1), Park, Sickles, and Simar (2003) (PSS2), 
and Kneip, Sickles, and Song (2009) (KSS). PSSl propose three time invariant 
semi-parametric efficient estimators. Two of them are analogous to the fixed ef-
fects and HT estimators. PSS2 focus on the semi-parametric efficient estimation of 
random effects panel models with AR(1) disturbances. KSS estimate time-varying 
technical efficiency with a method related to principle component analysis.1 
In the Kalman (1960) filter setting, one can model the error term and the inef-
ficiency term as unobserved states. In contrast to Box-Jenkins approach, one can 
explicitly model non-stationary stochastic processes in the Kalman filter setting. 
This gives significant flexibility to the econometrician when modeling the ineffi-
ciency. Two less significant advantages are that it is easy to deal with missing 
observations and update estimates whenever new data is available. In this study, 
in the panel data framework, we use the Kalman filter to estimate the efficiencies 
of the firms. For this purpose we assume that the effects term capturing the effi-
ciencies of the firms is an AR(1) process. This assumption is consistent with the 
belief that firms learn from their mistakes.2 Note that the effects term gives the 
relative position of a firm in terms of efficiency. Although we assume the same 
time-invariant variance for the effects term, one can easily model the firm specific 
*See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2002) for an extensive survey on stochastic frontier analysis. Also, 
see Sickles (2005), and Hao and Sickles (2010) for a comparison of many efficiency estimators 
including the recent ones. 
2See Ahn, Good, and Sickles (2000), Desli, Ray, and Kumbhakar (2003), Huang and Chen (2009), 
and Tsionas (2006) for more details about learning models for efficiency. 
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variances as a function of exogenous variables. We apply the Kalman filter esti-
mator (KFE) to estimate the average efficiencies of the U.S. airlines during the 
period 1971-1986. 
2.2. Description of the Kalman Filter Estimator 
Consider a panel data for / firms observed over n periods. A general stochastic 
frontier model is given as follows: 
(2.1) Vijt = XiJtP + /xM + Bijt 
(2-2) niyt = TM/iiit_! + Tijt + ei,iit 
(2.3) T^t = TTTitt-i + e2,i,t •;t 
- I 
ei,i,t e2,i,t NID(0, Q), and Vitt are indepen-where ei<t ~ NID(0,al), ei)t = 
dently distributed error terms. 
The component fj,it is the random heterogeneity specific to ith observation which 
determines the efficiency and is an AR(1) process with trend Tj?t. Here we treat 
AR(1) processes in a broader context and allow the possibility of non-stationarity. 
For example, a random walk is an AR(1) process in our language. Hence, we do 
not restrict ourselves to stationary processes. It is very easy to extend the above 
model to simultaneous equations panel data setting if one treats yiit as a vector of 
measurement equations that consists of relevant simultaneous equations. Hence, 
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for example, one can easily estimate a translog cost function with factor share 
equations.3 Moreover, recently Kim and Kim (2007) provided a way to deal with 
endogeneity problem in the Kalman filter setting.4 We calculate the time-varying 
cost frontier intercept common to all producers in period t as /2t = min^ Jiit. The 
technical efficiency is then estimated as TEitt — exp(—uitt), where uiit = /2it — jut. 
Equations 1-3 can be rewritten as: 
(2.4) Vi,t = Xittp + ZBi,t + eitU eiit~NID(0,a2e) 
(2.5) Bi,t = TBift-i + e^t, ei,t~NID(0,Q) 
where 
Bitt — 
-
»i,t 
Ti,t 
, £i,t = 
ei,i,t 
e2,i,t 
,T = 
T 1 
0 TT 
, and Z = 1 0 
Then, the Kalman filter equations are given as follows: 
3If we interpret \iit as an efficiency term, then using share equations leads to Greene's problem. 
So for the simultaneous equations setting we assume that y.it is a traditional effects term. See 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2002) and Kutlu (2010-b) for more details about Greene's problem. 
4See Kim (2006), Jin and Jorgenson (2007), Kutlu (2010-a) for more details about this issue. 
Vi,t = Vi,t ~ xi,tP ~ Zbi>t 
7) Fiit = ZPitt]t^Z' + a2e 
8) Mi-t = PiAt-iZ' 
9) Kt\t = ht\t-i + Mi,tF-t\t 
10) bi,t\t = 6i,*|*_i + MittFrt\t 
11) Pi,t\t = Pi,t\t-i-Mi^Miit 
12) bitt\t-i = T,6i)t_1|t_1 
13) P i l t |t-i = TPit-m^r + Q 
The corresponding Kalman smoothing equations are: 
14) Liit = T-TMijF^Z 
15) n , . . ! = Z ' J ^ i t + Lj i trM 
16) W,,-i = Z'FjZ + L^N^Lij 
17) &i,t|t-l = &i,i|t-l + Pi,t\t-\fi,t-l 
18) V^ = Pj,t|t_i — Pi,t\t-\Ni£-\Pitt\t-\ 
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where ri<n = 0 and Ni>n = 0. 
The log-likelihood is given by: 
(2.19) ln(L) = J:U = constant- ^ £ £ (ln(Fw) + ^ ) 
where di is the number of diffuse states for ith group. 
For the initialization of the Kalman filter, one can use initial values that are 
implied by stationarity. In the case of non-stationary states, diffuse prior can 
be used. The traditional Kalman filter estimation is known to be numerically 
unstable due to rounding errors which might cause variances to be non-positive 
definite during the update process. One solution to this issue is using the square-
root Kalman filter. Hence, we further implement the square-root Kalman filter.5 
Note that a slightly modified version of our model generalizes the CSS estimator. 
CSS assume that the effects term is a time polynomial of degree two. For the sake 
of illustration assume that /j,it is a random walk with a random walk trend. Hence, 
we have: 
(2.20) nijt = Vi,t-i + Ti,t + eltiit 
(2.21) riJt - riit_i + e2,M, eM ~ NID(0,Q) 
See, Durbin. and Koopman (2001) for the square-root Kalman filter. 
47 
Moreover assume that Q —» 0. Hence, essentially e1)i]t = e2^t = 0 and fj,it is a 
deterministic function of initial values. It turns out that fj,it = /^il + ( t - l ) r M . If 
Tjit had a trend term <5i)t then we would have // i t = /ij x + (t — 1)T^I + (t — l)25ijt. 
Although the KFE gives significant flexibility to the modeler when modelling 
the efficiency and the error term, it might be dangerous to model the effects term 
blindly. For example, in the above model the modeler should have a good expla-
nation for why the effects term , fiit, is AR(1) rather than the irregular term, e^t-
An arguable defense for this is that if our model is well-specified, then we would 
expect no serial correlation in e^t- For those who are not comfortable about the 
AR(1) effects term, we propose the following model:6 
(2.22) yitt = a + XM/3 - expO/^) + eM, ei)t ~ NID(0,a2£) 
(2.23) nitt = PMiit_1 + ei,t, fn,t~NID(0,ol) 
where e^t and e^t are independently distributed error terms.7 
2.3. Efficiency Estimation: U.S. Airline Industry, 1971-1986 
Our purpose in this section is examining the efficiency trend in the U.S. airline 
industry between 1971-1986. We use an unbalanced panel data set with annual 
6See Emvalomatis, Stefanoul, and Lansink (2009) for another non-linear Kalman filter model for 
inefficiency. 
7Non-linearity of the exponential term is a problem for the Kalman filter estimation. To solve 
this issue one can use a Taylor series approximation to this term around ^it = (J.itt\t-i-
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observations over the period 1971-1986. The data set is generated from the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT), Form-41 reports and includes 235 observations 
based on 18 distinct airlines.8 The accounts from the DOT Form-41 were aggre-
gated into the four broad input measures of capital, labor, fuel, and materials; one 
output measure seat miles actually flown; and one output attribute, average stage 
length. The details of the data set is discussed in Baltagi, Griffin, and Rich (1995) 
and Baltagi, Griffin, and Vadali (1995). A brief description of the variables are 
given in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description Min %25 Qtl %75 Qtl Max Mean 
vc Invariable cost) 3.8724 54391 7.1173 8.3782 6.2853 
y ln(Seat miles flown) -1.3724 -0.2526 1.7532 2.7756 0.8000 
wt ln(Labor price) -0.9629 -0.4061 0.3205 0.6544 -0.0555 
wf ln(Fuel price) -2.1919 -1.5126 -0.1460 0.0578 -0.9509 
wm ln(Materials price) 4.7095 5.0402 5.5752 5.6605 5.2612 
k In(Capital) -1.5355 -0.7481 1.0846 1.8634 0.2024 
s ln(Stage length) 4.8925 5.5706 6.6111 6.9171 6.1003 
Capital is assumed to be a quasi-fixed input. The variable cost function is given 
by: 
8The Baltagi, Griffin, and Vadali (1998) data set had 268 observations and 23 airlines. The data 
set here omits the airlines with too few observations. 
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(2.24) vcitt = ayyitt + atkkj + aiasitt + ^ PjWj,i,t + Vi,t + £i,t 
3=1 J,m 
(2.25) ^,t = Tfi^-i + ei.t 
where e^t ~ NID(0, cr^) and e^t ~ NID(0, al) are independently distributed error 
terms. 
Let vci:t = ucj)t - wm,i,u u>i,i,t = wi,i,t ~ Wm,i,t, and Wfti>t = wfiiit - wm,i,t- After 
imposing the homogeneity, we have: 
(2.26) vcij = ayyitt + akkitt + assi<t + ^ /^Wj.i.t + [iiit + £iit 
(2.27) tojt = Tto,t-i + ei,t 
If the observed data cover a period of adjustment, the nit term will be non-
stationary. Hence, imposing stationarity might be a restrictive assumption. We 
avoid this problem by diffuse initialization of the /x,
 t term. We estimate the cost 
function via another model as well. The second model approximates the effects 
term via a Fourier polynomial of degree 2. The Fourier model is given by: 
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(2.28) vdij = ayyiit + akkitt + assitt + ] P PjWj,i,t + (J>i,t + £i,t 
2 
rn ™s V ^ r • /2ri7T. , 2 r t 7T . , 
(2.29) /ij
 t = a0i + > ^{aii sm( ) + a2i cos( )} 
The estimates for the cost function parameters and average inefficiencies are 
given in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1.9 
Table 2.2. Cost Function Estimates 
KFE Fourier 
vc Parameter Std Error p-value Parameter Std Error p-value 
y 0.5193 0.0434 0.0000 0.4062 O.O84I 0.0000 
k 0.2244 0.0472 0.0000 0.2425 0.0989 0.0142 
s 0.0721 0.0501 0.1498 0.1904 0.0787 0.0155 
wi 0.3873 0.0416 0.0000 0.4211 0.0905 0.0000 
wf 0.1811 0.0178 0.0000 0.1448 0.0307 0.0000 
a£ 0.0215 0.0045 0.0000 
ae 0.0379 0.0043 0.0000 
T 0.9961 0.0013 0.0000 
We also estimated the same model under the assumption that \iit is an AR(1) process with 
an AR(1) trend term. Bayesian information criteria suggests that we should omit the trend 
component. 
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Figure2.1. Co6tInefficiency 
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Year 
For the KFE, except the stage length parameter, as, all the parameters have 
the expected signs and are significant at any conventional level. The wrong sign 
for as is only incidental. Our inefficiency estimates agree with the previous chap-
ter's estimates. We can clearly see the effects of 1973 and 1979 oil shocks in the 
inefficiency estimates. Whenever airlines encounter a negative cost shock their 
inefficiency levels decrease. This accords with Hick's (1937) 'quiet life hypothesis' 
which states that monopolistic markets enjoy easy life. Negative cost shocks put a 
downward pressure on airlines' market power. As a result the managers put more 
effort into optimizing the profit levels and this increases efficiency levels of the air-
lines. Except the stage length parameter the parameter estimates for the Fourier 
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estimator (FE) is similar to the ones from the KFE. Moreover, except the bound-
ary time periods, the inefficiency estimates for the FE follows a similar pattern to 
the ones from the KFE. The reason for the mismatch might be due to the poor 
performance of the FE on the boundary.10 In many aspects the KFE estimates 
seem to be more sensible. 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this study we proposed a way to measure the cost efficiency via the Kalman 
filter. If the observed data cover a period of adjustment, then the effects term cap-
turing the efficiency will be non-stationary. Hence, imposing stationarity might 
be a restrictive assumption. We avoid this problem by diffuse initialization of the 
effects term. Indeed, for our empirical example the effects term is most likely di-
vergent. Our findings accords with Hick's 'quiet life hypothesis.' Hence, whenever 
the airlines' lose market power they become more efficient. 
10See Eubank and Speckman (1991) for more details. FE might not suit to our data well as it 
requires large sample size. We used it only for illustrative purposes. 
CHAPTER 3 
U.S. Banking Efficiency, 1984-1995 
3.1. Introduction 
The U.S. banking industry was a highly regulated industry, with limited entries 
until the 1980s, which might lead to persistent inefficiencies. Restricted compe-
tition created monopolies and oligopolies. In the 1970s, the emergence of less 
regulated instruments such as money market mutual funds started to take its toll 
on these inefficient banks. The competitive advantage of banks dropped dramat-
ically. In the 1980s, there were many events that had important implications for 
efficiencies of the U.S. banks. Some events include, deregulation of deposit interest 
rates, the formalization and tightening of bank capital requirements, the removal 
of some geographic restrictions to expansion, the entry of non-banks to the indus-
try, and innovations in information and financial technology. From the early 1980s 
to 1990s, numerous mergers and failures occurred. In short, inefficient banks could 
not stand this wave of change. This period was an era of increased efficiencies.1 
Productive efficiency is a measure of performance of firms. Economists can use 
the information on efficiencies of the firms to rank firms according their success 
in reaching their objectives and this can be used to improve firms' performances. 
1For more details see Berger et al. (1995) and Jayasiriya (2000). 
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Moreover, this information helps us to understand the effects of deregulations and 
mergers. One way to measure productive efficiency is using stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA). SFA is originated by two innovational papers: Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977), and Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1984). Jondrow et al. (1982) 
provided a way to estimate the firm specific productive efficiency. All these works 
were in cross section framework. Unfortunately, in this framework we cannot 
consistently estimate the efficiencies of the firms. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) solve 
this problem by applying fixed effects and random effects models to estimate the 
efficiencies of the firms. In this study the efficiencies of the firms were assumed 
to be time-invariant which might not be a proper assumption for long panel data. 
Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) (CSS), Kumbhakar (1990), and Battese-
Coelli (1992) exemplify some of the earlier papers that relaxed this assumption.2 
We estimate the time-varying average efficiencies of the U.S. banks during the 
period 1984-1995 with four different efficiency estimators. Using these four series 
of efficiency estimates, we make a multivariate Kalman filter3 analysis to examine 
the efficiency trend in the U.S. banks during this period. 
3.2. Empirical Model 
In this section we follow Adams, Berger, and Sickles (1999).4 We start with an 
output distance function to model the technology of a firm with multiple inputs 
2See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for a book-length treatment of SFA. 
3See Kalman (1960). 
4Park, Sickles, and Simar (2003), Sickles (2005), Kneip, Song, Sickles (2008), and Hao and Sickles 
(2009) exemplify some other studies that followed the same approach. 
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and outputs. For a particular firm i at time t, an output distance function with m 
output and n input can be approximated by: 
(3.1) l l j f < 1 n
mvaj 
3 Zj,it 
nn yPk k ^k,it 
where a/s and /?fc's are weights describing the technology of a firm. 
If a firm is fully efficient the value of the distance function equals 1. We 
construct the corresponding stochastic Cobb-Douglas form that describes the above 
technology as follows: 
(3.2) - ln(ym,«) = £ , <*j HYj,it) ~ Efc Pk ln(Xfc,ft) + uit + eit 
YiM is where Ymu is the normalizing output and Y a = T^- for j = 1,2,..., m — 1, ua i
the non-negative radial technological inefficiency term. 
Letting yit = -ln(Ymtit), yjtit = ln(Yj>it), and xk,u = -ln(Xkiit) we can rewrite 
the model as: 
(3.3) Uit = J2j ajVj,it + 12k Pkxk,it + Uit + Sit 
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The output distance function is homogenous of degree one in outputs. In order 
to interpret the effects as radial measures, the right-hand side output is assumed 
to be exogenous.5 
3.3. The Data 
We use yearly panel data from 1984 through 1995 for 667 U.S. commercial banks 
in limited regulatory branching. The data for cost and production are obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The FDIC Summary of Deposits and 
the Report of the condition and Income (Call Report) are the primary sources of 
the data. A brief description of the data is given in Table 3.1.6 
Table 3.1: Description of Variables 
Variable Name 
Rein (Y3) 
Cil (Yl) 
Inln (Y2) 
CD (X1) 
DD (X2) 
OD (X3) 
Lab (X4) 
Cap (X5) 
Purf (X6) 
Description 
Real estate loans 
Commercial and industrial loans 
Installment loans 
Certificate deposits 
Demand deposits 
Retail time and saving deposits 
Labor 
Capital 
Purchased funds 
5See Park, Sickles, and Simar (2003) for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
For a more detailed discussion of the data see Jayasiriya (2000). 
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3.4. Description of the Estimators and the Results 
3.4.1. Estimators 
Table 3.2 gives a brief description of efficiency estimators that we used in our study. 
Table 3.2: Estimator List 
Estimator Reference 
CSSW (CSS within Estimator) Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) 
CSSG (CSS GLS Estimator) Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) 
BC (Battese-Coelli estimator) Battese and Coelli (1992) 
KSS (Kneip-Sickles-Song Estimator) Kneip, Sickles, and Song (2008) 
Now, we describe these estimators in more detail. A general stochastic frontier 
model is given by:7 
(3.4) yit = a + X'itp + eit, i = 1, ...,N;t = 1, ...,T 
where eit = vit - uit. 
vit ~ N(0, al) is the traditional error term and uit > 0 term is a term that 
captures the technical efficiency. 
7See also Hao and Sickles (2010) and Sickles (2005) for more details about these estimators. This 
section heavily relies on Hao and Sickles (2010). 
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3.4.1.1. CSSW and CSSG estimators: The model is given by: 
(3.5) yit = X^ + Z'ft + Wtfi + e*, i = 1, ...,N;t = 1, ...,T 
(3.6) 6i = 50 + Ui 
where ut ~ iid(0, al) 
or 
(3-7) yi4 = XltP + Zfr + Wtfo + eit 
(3.8) utt = W-tUi + eit 
In matrix notation (3.7) and (3.8) becomes: 
(3.9) y = X(3 + Z~/ + W50 + v 
(3.10) v = Qu + e 
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where Q = diagiWi). 
Let PQ = Q{Q'Q)~1Q' and MQ — I — PQ be projection matrices on Q and its 
orthogonal space respectively. Then the CSSW estimate for /3 is given by: 
(3.11) hssw = {X'MQX)-lX'MQy 
CSSG estimate for (/3,7, So)' is given by: 
(3.12) (MM = [(x,z, wya-\x,z, w)](x,z, wyn^y 
where CI = cov(v). 
CSSG assume that Qu is uncorrelated with (X, Z, W) while CSSW do not make 
such an assumption. CSS assume that otit = a — uu = 9io + Out + 9i2t2. One can 
estimate Uu = &t — &u and at = maxj(dj4). 
3.4.1.2. BC Estimator. BC estimator is a maximum likelihood estimator and 
thus has stronger assumptions on the efficiency term than CSSW and CSSG. The 
technical efficiency of a firm is given as an exponential function of time. The model 
is given by: 
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(3.13) Ylt = {Xitf3)zxv{vit-uit) 
(3.14) vit = rjitUi = exp(-rj(t - T))m 
(3.15) vit ~ N ( 0 , ^ ) 
(3.16) uit ~ N + ( 0 , O 
3.4.1.3. KSS Estimator. We briefly describe the KSS estimator. 
(3.17) ln(yit) = ^ + J ^ /5fc ln(xnit) - urt + vit 
where /50t denotes an average function, and uu are non-constant individual effects. 
In order to ensure identifiability KSS assume that ]T\ «it = 0 for all t. 
The influence of /30t is eliminated by using centered variables ln(cit) — ln(Qt), 
In xnit - In xnit, where ln(cit) = ^J2i ln(cjt) a n d l n ^nit = \ Y,iln%*• 
(3.18) 
p 
ln(ca)-ln(ca) = 5^/8j(lna;nit-In x„it) + rtit+ ««-««, * = 1 , . . . ,M = 1,...,T, 
withUit = £ £ ( « « . 
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KSS assume that uu represent 'smooth' time trends. For a given L G {1,2,. . . }8, 
KSS model ua via some basis functions (common factors) <7i, •. . , <?£, such that 
L 
(3.19) uit = y^Jjrgr(t). 
r = l 
The estimations are done by using partial spline estimation technique. We 
omit the details of the estimation method and direct the interested reader to the 
KSS paper. After estimating the effects, uit, the time-varying technical efficiency 
of firms are calculated as follows: 
(3.20) effu = exp(uit -maxuit) 
3.4.1.4. The Estimates. Table 3.3 gives parameter estimates.9 
L is estimated with the data. 
9Any firm whose effects are included in the upper and bottom %5 range at least at one time 
period were trimmed. Hence, we deleted more than %10 of firms for time varying estimators, (see, 
Berger (1993)). Trimming does not apply to BC since it directly calculates technical efficiencies. 
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Table 3.3 Parameter Estimates 
CSSW CSSG BC KSS 
0.0010(0.0015) 
0.1592 (0.0043) 0.1193 (0.0030) 
0.3658 (0.0058) 0.3243 (0.0049) 
-0.0358(0.0046) -0.0019(0.0019) 
-0.0445(0.0144) -0.0193(0.0109) 
-0.1400(0.0096) -0.0306(0.0201) 
-0.1620(0.0161) -0.0913(0.0095) 
-0.0540 (0.0051) -0.0250 (0.0052) 
-0.5784(0.0200) -0.5751(0.0299) 
ATE 0.6230 0.6282 0.5778 0.6027 
Time 
Ciln 
Inln 
CD 
DD 
OD 
Lab 
Cap 
Purf 
-
0.1470(0.0037) 
0.3516(0.0056) 
-0.0099 (0.0032) 
-0.0813 (0.0138) 
-0.1245(0.0071) 
-0.1508(0.0146) 
-0.0458 (0.0054) 
-0.5263(0.0195) 
-
0.1585(0.0013) 
0.3623(0.0018) 
-0.0175(0.0015) 
-0.0888 (0.0037) 
-0.1229(0.0047) 
-0.1988(0.0042) 
-0.0533 (0.0017) 
-0.4790 (0.0052) 
All estimators give expected signs. In terms of statistical efficiency CSSG seems 
to perform better than others. But the Hausman-Wu test indicates that there is 
endogeneity in our model. This implies that CSSG and BC will give inconsistent 
estimates. But this does not imply that they do not carry any useful information 
about the technical efficiencies. Hence, we include them in our analysis. We log 
transformed average efficiency estimates in our analysis. Since each estimator is 
trying to estimate the same phenomenon, we might have common factors in levels 
or/and slopes. Hence, our model allows for this possibility.10 
The level and slope model in which the level variance matrix is of rank iV 
whereas the slope variance is of rank KT is given by: 
'See Harvey (1989) and Koopman et al. for details. 
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(3.21) yt = m + et, et~NID(0,E£) 
fxt = //,_! + 6TTt + re + 7jt, vt~NID(0,Xv) 
rt = r t _ 1 + ^ t , £t~NID(Q,Dt) 
( 
where N x KT matrix 6T is such that S^ = 9TD^8'T, and 0r = with 6 is a 
V 
vector of length N — KT. 
Using tests developed by Nyblom and Harvey (2001), we observed the presence 
of common slopes. Indeed, the rank of slope covariance matrice is one. Considering 
that we have a small sample data, this information considerably improved our 
estimation results. The estimates for each estimator is given in Figure 3.1. The 
CSSG estimator seems to be more pessimistic about the efficiency growth compared 
to other estimators. The estimated slope is positive until 1990, though it is negative 
afterwards. But we can not reject that there is no growth in efficiency for any time 
period between 1984-1995 for CSSG. Opposite to the CSSG estimator the BC 
estimator suggests that the slope is always positive. In any case, we should be 
suspicious about these estimations, as both of these estimators are inconsistent. 
However, CSSW shows a similar pattern with CSSG; as expected, the slope is 
positive until 1992 and very close to zero thereafter. But we cannot reject that 
the slope is zero after 1988. KSS estimates are more optimistic about efficiency 
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Figure 3.1. Level-and Siope Estimates. 
1985 1990 1995 198S 1990 1995 
growth. According to KSS, the slope is always positive. We can not know whether 
KSS or CSSW are more reliable, but we can confidently say that, at least between 
1984 and 1988 there was a positive growth in average efficiency. Note that, the 
growth rate of the average efficiency decreases over time, because it gets harder to 
improve efficiency as you approach the production frontier. 
In the remaining part of this section, we present the diagnostics results of 
our model. Figure 3.2 shows the diagnostics results for the standardized onje-step 
ahead prediction error. Our model assumes that st,rit, and £t are normally distrib-
uted and serially independent with constant variances. Under these assumptions, 
the standardized one step prediction errors are also serially independent with unit 
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variance. As it can be seen from Figure 3.2, irregular terms from each efficiency 
estimator are serially independent. Box-Ljung test statistics for first 5 autocor-
relations for CSSW, CSSG, KSS, and BC are 11.185, 8.7238, 5.4239, and 7.9784 
respectively. These values also support for independence at 5% significance level.11 
Durbin-Watson test results are also similar. Moreover, QQ plots suggest that 
the irregular term is normally distributed. Bowman-Shenton statistics for CSSW, 
CSSG, KSS, and BC are 0.92193, 0.25375, 0.46081, and 0.36329 respectively. These 
values are below 5% significance critical level. We also tested for heteroskedasticity 
of error terms using the following statistics: 
(3.22) H(h) £-*it=T-h+\ Vt yd+l+h o V a + i + A ,,2 
where vt is the standardized one step prediction error at time t, T is the time period, 
d is the loss in the degree of freedom, and h is the closest integer to (T — d)/3. This 
statistics is approximately distributed as F(h,h). H statistics for CSSW, CSSG, 
KSS, and BC are 0.99282, 2.3613, 0.25122, and 0.43939 respectively. These values 
are below 5% significance level. Thus homoskedasticity is supported by this test. 
3.5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we estimated growth rate of average efficiency in U.S. banking 
industry between 1984-1995. For this purpose, we used the multivariate Kalman 
11
 The test is based on 3 degrees of freedom \2-
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• • • • • i . . . i -^ - i ; , .1. J i i •!, ,i>ife)w.i M P T ; , , , i i • • , i , , 
1985 1990 1995 0 5 10 -1.5 - I -0.5 0 -1.25 -1.00 -0.75 
filter in which each measurement equation is determined by an efficiency estimator. 
We observed that the regulations and innovations had a positive effect on the 
efficiency of U.S. banks as expected. However, this positive effect decayed through 
time. Indeed, according to the CSSW estimates, the growth in average efficiency 
of banks stopped around 1992.12 
!Note that after 1988 we can not reject the hypothesis that there is no growth. 
CHAPTER 4 
Battese-Coelli Est imator with Endogenous Regressors 
4.1. Introduction 
The Battese-Coelli (1992) (BC) estimator is a very widely used estimator in 
stochastic frontier analysis literature. This is mostly because of its simplicity and 
availability. Unfortunately, in the presence of endogenous regressors this estimator 
gives inconsistent parameter estimates. Following Kim and Kim (2007)1 we deal 
with the endogeneity problem for the BC estimator. This is accomplished by 
decomposing the irregular term into two parts: one correlated with the regressors 
and the other not. After the decomposition, one can use a slightly modified version 
of the BC estimator in order to estimate the parameters model and the technical 
efficiencies of the firms. 
4.2. Estimation Procedure 
Consider the following production model with endogenous explanatory vari-
ables: 
^ee Kim (2006) for similar approaches. 
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(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
V* t — xitP + Sit ~~ uit 
xit = Z'it8 + vit 
Vit 
Sit 
— 
V i - 1 / 2 
Sit 
~N( 0 
0 
7 
-*77l 
p'a£ 
P°e 
°l . 
) 
where yu is the dependent variable; ^ i s a m x l vector of regressors; Zit = Im <g) zit 
where zit is a / x 1 (with I > m) vector of exogenous variables. 
For the sake of avoiding unnecessary details, we assume that all regressors 
are endogenous. It is assumed that the irregular term eit is correlated with the 
regressors though independent of the inefficiency term uit = r)tUi, where u, is a 
non-negative truncation of the N(/z, cr„) distribution and r\t = exp(—rj(t — T)). 
Moreover, regressors are independent with the inefficiency term. 
By a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of 
we can represent vit eit as follows: 
vit
 £it 
(4.4) vit 
Sit 
Im 0 
a£p' aeyj\ - pip 
Vit 
wit 
where vit and wit ~ N(0, (1 — p'p)<J2£) are independent. 
Hence, we can write the production equation as follows: 
(4.5) yit = x'it(3 + aep'vit + wit - uit 
= x'itP + a^YT^ixit - Z'J ) + wit- uu 
Let yi = (yu,yi2,..;yiT)', xt = {x'il,x'i2,...,x'iT)', y = (y'^y^-
(x[, x'2,..., x'N)'. The joint density function of y and x is given by: 
(4.6) f(y,x) = Y[. J(yi\xi)f(xi) 
Defining eit = wit - uiu e* = (ea,e i2, ...,e iT)', and vt = (v'a, 
conditional density function of Ui given e* and vt is given by: 
{A7, f ( , exp(-|[K-/xn/a12) > n 
(27r)^a*[l - * ( - t f / ^ ) ] ! 
where 
*
 = /i(l - pV)^ - rfejol 
a*
2
 = 
(1 - p'p)alal 
(1 - p'p)a\ + r)'r\o\ 
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The conditional expectation of technical efficiency, TEu = exp(—Ua), is: 
(4.8) E[eM-uu)K Vi\ = 1 i%^/li)*)] eM-Vtri + ^ ? 0 
The log-likelihood function for the sample observations, (y,x), is: 
(4.9) lnL = ln/(y|z) + ln/(a;) 
where 
ln/(y|a;) = ~ ln(27r) - ^ l) ln((l - p'p)cr2) - y ln((l - p'p)a\ + r?VD 
-iVln(l - $ ( - / ^ K ) ) + E i i M l - *{-M°*)) ~ \N{-? 
_ 1 V J V ^T (Vit - x'it(3 - pfaeEZ1/2(xit - Z'it5 ))2 1 jy X 2 
2 2^=i 2L.t=i ^ _ ^ f f 2 + 2 ^* = 1 V * j 
!*/(*) = ~ l n ( 2 7 r ) - ^ l n ( | E 1 , | ) - i E i i E L « l . ^ 1 « « 
Using the parametrization of the model, where (1 — p'p)a\ + a\ = a | and 
2 
7 = §£, the conditional log-likelihood function, /(y|:r), is expressed by:2 
2This parametrization is a variation of the parametrization suggested by Battese and Corra 
(1977). 
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(4.10) ln/(y|x) NT 
N. 
ln(27r) - ^ - l n t f ) - ^ ( r o 1} ln(l - 7) NT 2 
- — ln(l + (7/77 - 1)7) - N ln(l - $ ( - * ) ) 
1 
'2 ' 
1. 
2 
- ^ ( f ) 2 + ^ £f=1**2-i£f=1 1 2 
AM, 
(1 - i)o* 
where * = j-fa, A = - ( ^ ^ E ^ p , X, = Xji £ j 2 • • • ^ i r 
Z'J, Xitf) &n(6) xi2{5) . . . xiT(S) 
, xit(S) = 
,Ai =
 y i - X{{& - A) - Xi(Sy\, and 
27 = 
fj.(i-~/)—rn'Aj 
(7(i-7)^[i+(^-i)7])1 / 2 -
We consider a similar two-stage procedure in our Monte Carlo experiments. 
In the first stage the econometrician predicts vu via OLS using (4.2), and then 
maximizes the following log-likelihood function: 
(4.11) In f(y\x) = NT 
N 
ln(27T) - ^ ln t f ) - * 2 L J ) ln ( i _ 7 ) 
— - ln(l + (7/77 - 1)7) - iVln(l - $ ( - * ) ) 
~ ^
2
 + ^Ef=iln(l - * ( - < ) ) 
A1 \2 , ^ V ^ *2 A:At 
2 V j + 2 2 - i = 1 * 2 ^ i = 1 (1 -
 7)<7; 
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where £itis the estimate of vit from OLS, z = -.—^7^, A = i}\^?\ )l^2p, X{ = ( 7 f | (I-P'P) 
Xji Xj2 • • • XiT 
li{l-l)-frt'Aj 
( 7 ( 1 - 7 ) < T 1 [ 1 + ( ^ - 1 ) 7 ] ) 1 / 2 ' 
Vi = Va Vi2 . . . ViT ,Ai = Vi- X'i/3 - vtX, and z* = 
Unfortunately, the standard errors from this two-stage method are inconsistent. 
The problem is that the estimates are conditional on estimated standardized error 
terms from the first stage. Hence, a proper bootstrapping procedure should be 
implemented in order to get the correct standard errors. 
4.3. Monte Carlo Simulations 
In this section we implement Monte Carlo experiments to examine the small 
sample performance of our estimator. For this purpose we considered the following 
data generating process: 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
%2it 
%lit 
Zit 
Vit 
£it 
Yit = xiuP-L + x2itf32 + £u - uu, £it ~ N(0, a2£) 
ZitS + vtt, vit~N(0,cr2v) 
= R 
N( 
Xii,t-1 
Z%,t-1 
0 
0 
+ U, £«~N(0,/2) 
pa£av 
pa£av 
^ 2 
73 
where & = 0.5, /32 = 0.5, a\ = 1, u\ = 1, p = 0.8, 5 = 1, R = 
0.4 0.05 
0.05 0.4 
and 
2 i l 
NCO.C/a-H2)"1)-
Then the generated values for x\ and z are shifted around three different means 
to obtain three balanced groups of firms. We chose ^ = (5,5)', /x2 = (7-5,7.5)', 
and fj,3 — (10,10)' as the group means.3 Although, v is determined by only z, 
we used the constant, xi, and z in order to estimate v. Simulation experiments 
were repeated 10000 times. Simulation results for coefficient estimates are given 
in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. 
Table 4.1: Performances for Exogenous Case 
N=30 T=50 p = 0 BC BCIV BCIV2 
Coef. MSE 
Coef. Varl 
Coef. Var2 
Coef. Biasl 
Coef. Bias2 
Eff. MSE 
Ave. Rho 
0.0006 0.0009 0.0009 
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
0.0214 0.0214 0.0214 
0.0003 0.0003 
'When generating regressors we followed Park, Sickles, and Simar (2002). 
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Table 4.2: Performances for Endogenous Case 
N=30 T=50 p = 0.8 
Coef. MSE 
Coef. Varl 
Coef. Var2 
Coef. Biasl 
Coef. Bias2 
Eff. MSE 
Ave. Rho 
BC 
0.1154 
0.0004 
0.0002 
0.1284 
-0.3135 
0.0809 
BCIV 
0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0001 
6.0003 
0.0087 
0.0802 
BCIV2 
0.0003 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0088 
0.0801 
Simulations show that when there is no correlation both the joint and the two-
stage estimators perform almost as good as the BC estimator. But if there is 
correlation, then the BC estimator is severely biased and our method fixes this 
bias. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This paper paved the way for estimating time-varying technical efficiency via 
a modified version of the Battese-Coelli estimator in the presence of endogenous 
regressors. This is done by decomposing the irregular term into two parts: one 
correlated with the regressors and the other not. The correlated part is used as 
a bias correction term and the other part remained an irregular term. Unfortu-
nately, the standard errors for the two-stage procedure are inconsistent and should 
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be corrected via a bootstrapping procedure. As a conclusion, our Monte Carlo 
experiments show that the proposed method works fine in a small sample. 
CHAPTER 5 
Price Discrimination in Stackelberg Competition 
5.1. Introduction 
There is a large recent literature on price discrimination in oligopolistic con-
texts.1 The literature varies in oligopoly models and types of discrimination con-
sidered. For example, Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989) examine third degree 
price discrimination in Bertrand models. Hazledine (2006) examines second degree 
price discrimination in a Cournot model. In the second degree formulation, the 
firm is able to segment consumer demand by ranges of reservation price. Con-
sumers with reservation price between r\ and r2 pay one price, those between r2 
and r3 pay another, and so on. He shows that the output sold at a particular 
price is a multiple N of the output sold at the next lowest price, where N is the 
number of firms in the market. 
In this paper, we examine second degree price discrimination as modeled by 
Hazledine (2006) and apply it to the Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. 
We find that, in contrast to Hazledine's results, under the Stackelberg formula-
tion, only the follower price discriminates. The leader directs all of its first mover 
preemptive advantage to attract the highest value customers who pay a uniformly 
^ e e Stole (2007) for a survey. 
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high price. The follower price discriminates over the residual demand. Another re-
sult of price discrimination is that profits and total welfare are larger and consumer 
surplus is smaller than those of the standard Stackelberg competition model. 
5.2. Hazledine's Model 
For the linear demand case Hazledine (2006) extends the standard Cournot 
model to the case where firms can price discriminate. He finds that the average 
price that is charged in this model is the same as that of the standard Cournot 
model. But it will underpredict the total output. Unfortunately, Hazledine do not 
make any comment about a pricing game that could support his model.2 
Now, we give Hazledine's model. A homogenous product is purchased in unit 
quantity and the valuation of the customers is distributed linearly and given by: 
(5.1) V = l-Q 
Sellers know the valuation of the customers and can prevent resale of the good. 
He motivates this model by considering the goods as airline seats and the firms 
as airlines. It is assumed that there are K distinct fares in the market where K 
is determined exogenously. The price of a ticket is determined by the following 
formula: 
2See Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) for a pricing game that supports Cournot game. 
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(5.2) PK = 1 - Q1 - Q2 - ... - Qk 
where Qk is the number of seats sold at price Pk. 
Furthermore, Hazledine assume that there are n symmetric firms in the market 
and solves the symmetric equilibrium for this game. He finds that: 
1 - c 
# > + ... + n + l 
NK~k + c(NK - NK'k) 
where c is the cost of a unit good, Nj = n ^ + n^-1^ + ... + n + 1 and n ^ denotes 
n to the power of j . 
Below we quote his propositions: 
"Proposition 1. Price discrimination in a symmetric linear Cournot-Nash 
oligopoly results in the output sold at a particular price being a multiple n of the 
output sold at the next lowest price, where n is the number of firms supplying the 
market." 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
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"Proposition 2. The average price charged (average revenue earned) in a 
symmetric linear Cournot-Nash oligopoly does not depend on the extent of price 
discrimination (number of different prices offered)." 
5.3. The model and results 
We consider a leader-follower duopoly with no cost of entry. Let c be the con-
stant marginal cost of the leader and the follower. We assume that each consumer 
buys at most one unit of the good. The firms know valuations of the consumers 
and can prevent resale of the good. They divide the consumers into bins according 
to their reservation prices. The price of the good for the kth bin is given by: 
(5.6) Pk = a-Qk 
where Qk = X^=i(?£ + qlF) is the total quantity sold in all bins from 1 to k. 
A good example for such a setting is airline seats offered for a specific route. 
Airline tickets are purchased in unit quantity and it is a common practice for 
airlines to price discriminate. For the airline case, one can think that consumers 
come to the market at different times and their valuations are inversely related 
with the length of time between purchase and flight. For example, business people 
learn of their travel plans at the last moment, and are willing to pay much more 
than tourists, who are at the other extreme and know their travel plans a year 
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ahead of time. The linear demand assumes a continuum of people between these 
extremes. From now on we will call the product 'an airline seat' and a seller 'an 
airline.' 
Before stating our results, we would like to remind the reader of some standard 
results from theories of monopoly and oligopolistic competition: A monopolist 
produces ^ and each of the symmetric Cournot duopolist produces ^ . Finally, 
under the standard Stackelberg competition model, the leader produces ^ , and 
the follower produces ^ . Note that the leader produces the monopoly output 
which is more than the Cournot output. This is because of the strategic benefit 
of inducing the second mover to reduce output. In what follows, we state our 
propositions for Stackelberg model with price discrimination. 
Proposition 1. Suppose that price discrimination is permitted in a symmetric 
linear Stackelberg competition duopoly model with K bins. Then, in equilibrium, 
only the follower price discriminates. The equilibrium quantities and prices are: 
a — c q\ = —^-and(fL=0forj = 2,Z,...,K 
•i 1 O, — C „ . _ „ OF = 77— -—— for j = 1,2,..., K K + 1 2 
Pj = a-(l+j±-)^ for j = 1,2,...,K 
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Proposition 1 shows that the leader allocates all its production to bin 1 and lets 
the follower do the discrimination. By doing this, the leader enjoys high profits 
from the high-end customers. The follower spreads its output equally among the 
bins. In order to explain the intuition for why the leader allocates all its production 
to bin 1, assume for now that K = 2. In addition to preempting the high-end 
consumer, the leader would preempt the low-end as well. But if the leader were to 
deviate from allocating all of its output to bin 1 and allocate some output to bin 
2, then this would induce the follower to allocate more output to bin 1. When the 
follower decides how much to allocate to bin 1, it takes into account the negative 
impact of an expansion in bin 1 output on the profits of bin 2. If the leader 
expands output in bin 2, then bin 2 becomes less important to the follower which 
causes it to allocate more output to bin 1. The negative effect on the leader's bin 
1 consumers would offset the gains to the leader from obtaining bin 2 consumers. 
This contrasts with the standard Stackelberg dynamics in which when the leader 
expands output, the follower reduces output. Here, the follower lowers output in 
bin 2; the problem for the leader is that the follower expands output in bin 1. 
Other implications of Proposition 1 are as follows: First, as the number of the 
bins increases price converges to the marginal costs of the firms and the follower 
allocates essentially no output in bin 1. This is a vertical separation where the 
leader grabs the high-value consumers and leaves the lower ones to the follower. 
Second, one can show that if a monopolist can price discriminate, then it pro-
duces qxM = cflf = q~. So, although in the standard Stackelberg model the leader 
82 
produces the monopoly output (without price discrimination), if it can price dis-
criminate, it produces less than the monopoly output (with price discrimination).3 
Finally, the price charged by the leader is higher than the Stackelberg competition 
price and the output-weighted price charged by the follower4 is the same as the 
Stackelberg competition price. 
Proposition 2. Suppose that price discrimination is permitted in a symmet-
ric linear Stackelberg competition duopoly model with K bins. Profits of both the 
leader and the follower are higher compared to profits they would get in the standard 
Stackelberg competition. Although the consumer welfare is lower, the total welfare 
is higher. The profits, consumer welfare, and total welfare are: 
K
 (a - c ) \ 1 (a - c)2
 s 
*
L =
 K + l 4 > 2 ~ ^ = V L 
*
F =
 K+i 8 > 2 ^ r _ = ^ 
= ^±5^+3 (a-cf 9 (o-c£ 
(K+l)2 8 4 8 
_ 4/Ta+8JT + 3 (a - c)2 15 (a - cf s 
(K + l)2 8 > 4 8 
Note that in the case of price discrimination the leader produces the monopoly output without 
price discrimination. 
83 
Proposition 2 shows the welfare effects of price discrimination. Because of the 
strategic interactions between the leader and the follower it might have been the 
case that the profits of both firms decrease as the degree of price discrimination 
increases. But it turns out that in our model the profits of both firms increase. 
Indeed, the profit of the leader increases even though the quantity that it produces 
remains the same. The reason for this is that the follower abandons the high-
value consumers to focus on the low-value ones. Finally, note that total welfare 
monotonically converges to the socially optimal level of welfare, as K goes to 
infinity. In Figure 5.1. one can see the patterns of profits as well as welfares. 
Apparently, for K = 7 the total welfare as well the profits of the airlines are 
approximately maximized. 
Recently Kumar and Kutlu (2010) provided another price discrimination model 
for the Stackelberg competition. In their model the firms play a three stage game: 
In the first stage the leader chooses the total capacity, QL; In the second stage 
the follower chooses the total capacity, QF; and in the last stage the firms simul-
taneously compete on the bin shares. In contrast to our results Kumar and Kutlu 
(2010) conclude that the leader price discriminate as well. The simultaneity in the 
final stage dramatically decreases the control of the leader. While the follower still 
do not generate as much profit as the leader, their profit levels are substantially 
close. 
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5.4. The Proofs 
The quantity of j t h fare provided by the leader and the follower are qJL and (fF, 
respectively. Let QJL = £^= 1 q\, Cfp = Yji=i 9F> Q3 = <2i + Q F ' a n d o> = a - c. 
We first consider the decision problem of the follower. The profit of the follower is 
given by: 
(5.7) nF(qL) = qlF{Pl-c) + q2F{P2-c) + ... +qKF(PK-c) 
= qlF{a-Ql) + q2F{a-Q2) + ... + qKF{a-QK) 
85 
Differentiating with respect to the decision variables (fF for j = 1,2..., K gives 
the first order conditions for profit maximization: 
(5-8) Sx= a - (Ql+QF+ti) = 0 for j = 1, 2,.., K 
Then, 
o<rF
 dTF 
This implies that for all j = 2,3,..., K 
(5.10) <fL= (ff'-ti 
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Moreover, by equation (5.8) we have: 
(5.11) qlL= a - q\-QKF 
Now, we solve the maximization problem of the leader. The profit of the leader 
is given by: 
(5.12) TTL = ql(pi-c) + ql(P2-c) + ... + q«(PK-c) 
= ql(a - Q1) + q2L(a - Q2) + ... + qKL (a - QK) 
Substituting g£ and q\ from equations (5.10) and (5.11) respectively gives: 
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(5.13) nL = (a-q1F-Q^)(a~Q1) + (q1F-q2F)(a-Q2) + 
= (<x-q1F-Q$)(a-((a-q1F-Q$) + q1F))+ 
&-<&)(<* ~ ((« - QF-QF) + <1F+QF))+ 
(rf _ 1-^)(a - ((« - ^ - Q f ) + QF+QF'1)) 
= (<x-qF-QF')QF:+ 
(QF-QF)(QF-QF)+ 
= ((« - QF-QF) + (QF-<1F) + (&-&) + • 
- + (QF'1-QF))QF-
((qF-<lF)QF + (<lF-QF)QF+- + (QF^-Q^QF'1) 
= (a - QF~QF)QF-((QF-Q2F)QF+(<1F-QF)Q2F+ 
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By (5.13) we derive the first order conditions for the leader as: 
(5.14) ^ f = a - 2{Q*+(tF) = 0 for j = 1,2,..., K 
dq'p 
Hence, 
(5.15) QX+<fF=^ioTJ = l,2,...,K 
After summing (5.15) over j solving for Qp gives 
(5.16) Qf = F - H 
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By (5.15) and (5.16) the follower's optimal quantity for the fare class j 
1,2, ...,K is given by: 
(5
-
17)
 *-X+I-2-
By (5.10), (5.11), (5.16), and (5.17) the leader's optimal quantities for the fare 
class 1 is given by: 
(5-18) ^ = V 
(5.19) <fL = 0 for j = 2,3,..., K 
Given the quantities, both the calculation of prices and the proof of the Propo-
sition 2 are trivial; we leave them to the reader. 
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